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Abstract 
We explored the emotional and attitudinal consequences of personal attitude-behaviour 
discrepancies using a religious version of the hypocrisy paradigm. We induced cognitive 
dissonance in participants (n = 206) by making them feel hypocritical for advocating certain 
religious behaviours that they had not recently engaged in to their own satisfaction. In 
Experiment 1, this resulted in higher levels of self-reported guilt and shame compared to the 
control condition. Experiment 2 further showed that a religious self-affirmation task eliminated 
the guilt and shame. In Experiment 3, participants boosted their religious attitudes as a result of 
dissonance, and both religious and non-religious self-affirmation tasks eliminated this effect. The 
findings provide evidence that dissonance induced through religious hypocrisy can result in guilt 
and shame as well as an attitude bolstering effect, as opposed to the attitude reconciliation effect 
which is prevalent in previous dissonance research. 
Word count: 6,801 
Keywords: Cognitive dissonance, hypocrisy, religion, self-affirmation, attitude change
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      In recent years, the amount of attention and scrutiny directed at religious individuals and 
their beliefs, motivations, and behaviour has increased dramatically. This tendency has 
accelerated research on this topic from a number of perspectives. These include, but are not 
limited to, cognitive science, social psychology, and sociology (e.g., Barrett, 2000; Cohen, Hall, 
Koenig, & Meador, 2005; Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, Verschueren, & Dernelle, 2005; Shariff, 
Cohen, & Norenzayan, 2008; Slone, 2006). While a few studies have been carried out on 
religious cognitive dissonance (Burris, Harmon-Jones, & Tarpley, 1997; Dunford & Kunz, 1973; 
Mahaffy, 1996), no research to date has investigated religious hypocrisy experimentally. 
Examining this will not only inform our understanding of how personal inconsistencies affect 
religious individuals emotionally and attitudinally, but will also potentially identify key 
motivations in religious individuals.   
Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) proposes that when individuals realise a 
discrepancy between two of their cognitions (e.g., two attitudes that they hold) or between these 
and their behaviour, they experience a sense of dissonance, or emotional discomfort. Previous 
research has shown that this discomfort can be measured physiologically as arousal (Croyle & 
Cooper, 1983), and that individuals subsequently strive to eliminate the discrepancy and arousal 
through a reconciliatory attitude change. For example, when individuals are asked to voluntarily 
advocate a cause that clashes with their own attitudes (known as the induced compliance 
paradigm), they show a shift in their attitudes toward the advocated cause (for a review of key 
studies, and for a detailed outline of the moderators of this effect, refer to Cooper, 2007). One 
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particularly useful paradigm for investigating inconsistencies between individuals’ attitudes and 
their behaviour is the hypocrisy paradigm (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991). The paradigm is 
valuable to the study of cognitive dissonance because it studies naturally-occurring personal 
discrepancies, as opposed to the artificially-induced ones that are characteristic of much 
cognitive dissonance research such as the induced compliance paradigm where participants are 
asked to engage in a task that they are unlikely to do under normal circumstances, for example 
by writing counter-attitudinal essays (Cooper, 2007).  
The hypocrisy paradigm works by inducing cognitive dissonance in participants by first 
asking them to think of past failures to perform a given behaviour (in the original study, the 
behaviour was condom use), and then asking them to advocate why it is important to perform 
that behaviour. In the original study, Aronson, Fried, and Stone (1991) showed that this resulted 
in higher intentions to perform that behaviour in the future. Later studies, which changed the 
order of the tasks so that participants were asked to advocate the behaviour before thinking about 
past failures, showed that inducing cognitive dissonance in this way can also increase actual 
performance of pro-social behaviours, such as volunteering one’s time for a good cause (Fried, 
1998; Fried & Aronson, 1995). However, studies using the hypocrisy paradigm have not directly 
measured emotions, so the nature of the feelings that arise in individuals as a result of this kind 
of cognitive dissonance-induction remains to be investigated. Moreover, despite its aptness to 
measure the consequences of religious hypocrisy, this paradigm has not been used in this 
context.  
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Based on previous work that argues that religious people often battle with personal 
distress as a result of inconsistencies between their religious beliefs and their behaviour  (e.g., 
Exline, 2002), there is reason to experimentally investigate the nature and consequences of such 
inconsistencies. Religious individuals who realise personal inconsistencies with regard to their 
religion are more likely to feel stronger emotions, such as guilt and shame, than what general 
cognitive dissonance (e.g., regarding general behaviour) elicits. Indeed, previous research has 
identified shame and guilt as the key emotions that religious individuals feel in a number of 
contexts, such as coming to terms with their homosexuality (Sherry, Adelman, Whilde, & Quick, 
2012), mental health (Luyten, Corveleyn, & Fontaine, 1998), and health-seeking behaviours 
(Park, Edmondson, Hale-Smith, & Blank, 2009). What all these contexts have in common is that 
they represent discrepancies between religious beliefs and other aspects of social life. Hence, we 
predict in the present investigation that religious dissonance, too, is of a more specific affective 
nature (namely, guilt and shame), compared to the generalised discomfort found in cognitive 
dissonance research generally (Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Senemeaud & Somat, 2009). If this is 
true, it will be a notable exception to cognitive dissonance research generally, and research on 
hypocrisy specifically.   
Apart from examining the emotional consequences of religious dissonance, the hypocrisy 
paradigm also seems suitable to study attitudinal consequences of this kind of cognitive 
dissonance. Indeed, using this paradigm, McConnell and Brown (2010) found that individuals 
changed their attitudes about study habits as a result of dissonance. However, the direction in 
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which this change occurred was moderated by the personality trait of self-complexity – the 
extent to which one’s self-concept is comprised of numerous, separate roles/attributes (e.g., 
parent, athlete, or social activist). Individuals who had high self-complexity became more in 
favour of good study habits, whereas those who were low on self-complexity became less in 
favour of same. One of the explanations given for this finding was that the latter group felt more 
negativity as a result of the dissonance because of their relatively fewer self-facets compared to 
the other group who had a larger buffer to protect the self-concept as a whole. One of the 
questions that arise from this finding is whether there are contexts in which dissonance generally 
leads to a boost, rather than a reduction, in attitude strength as a consequence of dissonance. In 
fact, before Festinger (1957) published a full account of his theory and supporting evidence, he 
had already written a book about a case in which cognitive dissonance led to bolstering of 
attitudes (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956). The case was on a UFO cult who believed that 
the world would end on a given day. When this did not happen, the cult unexpectedly became 
even stronger in their belief that their predictions were correct; they came up with far-fetched 
ideas about why the end of the world did not happen on that particular day. Similarly, Batson 
(1975) did a quasi-experiment in which he presented anti-Christian material to Christians (this 
cognitive dissonance-induction technique is called the belief-disconfirmation paradigm). As a 
result, the participants became even stronger in their religious attitudes. A similar attitude 
bolstering effect was demonstrated by Sherman and Gorkin (Sherman & Gorkin, 1980) in a non-
religious context where individuals, especially those who scored high on a scale of feminism, 
bolstered their attitudes toward feminism after failing to solve a sex-role task. However, their 
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study did not use the induced compliance or the hypocrisy paradigms, but instead relied on the 
assumption that an inability to solve the task caused dissonance. As the authors themselves noted 
in their paper, the attitude bolstering may simply have been the result of a reminder of the 
importance of subscribing to feminism, rather than the result of dissonance. Nevertheless, 
Sherman and Gorkin’s (1980) study does indicate that an attitude bolstering, rather than a 
reconciliatory attitude change, may be the consequence of dissonance regarding attitudes that are 
central to the self-concept. 
Hence, it appears that when it comes to strong beliefs or attitudes, cognitive dissonance 
does not result in reconciliation, but rather in a bolstering of these. The present work attempts to 
examine whether dissonance leads to this same bolstering effect, when induced regarding 
religious attitudes. If religious dissonance leads to attitude bolstering, it will be an interesting 
deviation from the attitude change effect found in the induced compliance paradigm (where 
attitudes are reconciled with behaviour), and it will call for a revision of our understanding of the 
consequences of cognitive dissonance in contexts where religious beliefs or attitudes are at play. 
Another aspect of cognitive dissonance that is worth investigating in the religious context 
is self-affirmation (Sherman & Hartson, 2011; Steele & Liu, 1983). In their original paper on 
self-affirmation, Steele and Liu (1983) showed that dissonance and the associated attitude 
reconciliation could be eliminated by giving participants an opportunity to complete a 
questionnaire on a topic of personal relevance. The authors argued that through affirming an 
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important aspect of the self-concept, participants could alleviate their cognitive dissonance, 
possibly as a result of the boost to their self-esteem. Interestingly, their findings showed that the 
self-affirmation did not need to be relevant to the topic regarding which it was induced. This has 
been supported by previous work showing that a domain-nonspecific self-affirmation task is 
more effective in resolving dissonance because it affirms another aspect of the self-concept and 
thereby increases self-esteem (Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995). However, research on self-
affirmation following religious cognitive dissonance has not been carried out, so it remains to be 
seen whether self-affirmation can reduce dissonance in this context. 
The Present Research 
The first aim of the present investigation was to examine the emotional consequences of 
religious dissonance (Experiments 1 and 2). Experiment 2 further investigated whether an 
opportunity to self-affirm important religious attitudes can reduce negative affect. In Experiment 
3 we further investigated whether self-affirmation that was domain-specific (i.e., in this case 
related to religion) was any less successful in reducing any negative affect compared to a 
domain-nonspecific self-affirmation. The second aim of the present work (investigated in 
Experiment 3) was to explore whether dissonance leads to a boost in religious attitudes as a 
compensatory response to cognitive dissonance. Such a finding would corroborate Batson’s 
(1975) findings on religious attitude bolstering as a result of cognitive dissonance.  
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We introduce a religious version of the hypocrisy paradigm (Aronson et al., 1991; Fried 
& Aronson, 1995), which works by (a) making participants advocate a position that they are 
expected to support and then (b) making them mindful of their potential past failures to act 
according to the advocated attitudes. Hence, our manipulation offers a direct method of testing 
the consequences of cognitive dissonance because it forces participants to confront a potential 
discrepancy between their attitudes and their behaviour. By asking individuals how important 
they think that a given religious activity is, and then asking them how frequently they have 
engaged in that activity, cognitive dissonance was expected to result in individuals who felt that 
they had not engaged in the given religious activities sufficiently. The key methodological 
innovation, compared to the standard the hypocrisy paradigm, was to use multiple (religious) 
behaviours instead a single behaviour, because religious people might differ on how important 
they consider a given religious behaviour (e.g., praying). 
The modified dissonance paradigm consisted of asking participants how important six 
religious activities were in their faith, and then asking them to complete a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire consisted of three parts that asked participants to write: (a) why performing each of 
the religious activities was important, (b) how often they had engaged in the religious activities 
in the last seven days, and (c) how much time they thought that they should have spent on each 
of the religious activities in the last seven days. This was expected to cause cognitive dissonance, 
and hence negative affect and attitude change, in participants who stated that the religious 
 RELIGIOUS HYPOCRISY     10 
 
 
activities were important but who felt that they had not engaged frequently in the religious 
activities recently.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Forty-two participants (27 Christians and 15 Muslims; 27 females) took part 
in the study. The mean age was 22.6 years. Participants were selected from a participant panel 
from the University of Cambridge, which consisted of hundreds of participants who had 
completed demographic questions, including their religious affiliation. The three criteria for 
participation in the present experiment were that participants had to be over 18 years old, be 
fluent in English, and self-identify as either Christians or Muslims.    
Materials. A consent form was used to introduce the study by stating that it involved a 
survey on attitudes about religious and non-religious activities. It further informed, as part of the 
cover story, that the survey was designed to help the research group to develop religious 
educational resources for people interested in Christianity or Islam, depending on participants’ 
religious affiliation.  
A manipulation questionnaire was used to evoke feelings of cognitive dissonance in three 
steps: The first part of the questionnaire asked participants to write a reason for why they thought 
each of the six religious activities was an important practice for a religious person (for Christian 
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participants it said ‘for a Christian’, and for Muslim participants it said ‘for a Muslim’). The six 
religious activities were praying, scripture reading, going to a place of worship, telling non-
believers about one’s faith, helping the needy, and reading books about one’s faith. Participants 
were told in the instructions that the answers might be used for materials regarding the religious 
educational project mentioned in the consent form. The second part asked participants how much 
time they had spent on/how many times they had engaged in each of the six religious activities in 
the last seven days. The 9-point scale was intentionally stretched in that the scale intervals 
represented wide groupings so that most participants would score in the lower intervals (i.e., for 
the praying, Scripture reading, and reading books about your faith activities, the points were: 0, 
1-30 minutes, 30-60 minutes, 1-2 hours, 2-4 hours, 4-7 hours, 7-12 hours, 12-20 hours, and 20+ 
hours; for the going to a place of worship and telling non-believers about one’s faith, the points 
were: 0, 1, 2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-11, 12-14, 15-17, and 17+; and for the helping the needy activity the 
points were: 0, 1 pence-£1, £1-5, £5-10, £10-20, £20-30, £30-50, £50-70, and £70+). The third 
part asked participants how much time they thought that they should have spent on each of the 
activities over the last 7 days (on a 9-point scale from −4 to +4 where the negative scores 
indicated that they thought that they should have spent less time on a given activity and the 
positive scores indicated that they thought that they should have spent more time; if they were 
content with their recent behaviours, they were asked to select the mid-point, ‘0’). Hence, this 
third part of the questionnaire measured the level of the ‘behavioural gap’, which is the term that 
we used to describe the difference between participants’ recent behaviour and their ideal 
behaviour.  
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A control questionnaire was used in the control condition. It consisted of the same three 
components as the manipulation questionnaire but the behaviours referred to six non-religious 
behaviours (i.e., reading magazines, doing sports/exercise, cooking, going to the cinema, 
shopping, and listening to music). These neutral activities were chosen because participants were 
not expected to feel cognitive dissonance if they had not engaged much in them despite having 
advocated them. Participants were first asked to write reasons why each of the activities was a 
good practice for young people who were stressed about their studies. They were told that their 
answers may be used in materials for a project that encouraged stressed students to engage in de-
stressing activities. They were then asked how much time they had spent on/how many times 
they had engaged in these activities in the last seven days but unlike the manipulation 
questionnaire, these scales were not stretched (e.g., for the shopping activity, the points were: 0, 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, and 10+). Finally, they were asked how much time they thought that 
they should have spent on each.  
The Positive Affect Negative Affect (PANAS) questionnaire (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) was used to measure levels of negative affect following the manipulation. This scale 
consists of twenty adjectives, ten measuring positive affect and ten measuring negative affect. 
For the purpose of the present study, all ten negative emotions were included but only the five 
cognitive dissonance-relevant negative emotions of guilt, shame, irritability, distress, and upset 
were considered relevant to the predictions (the others were: hostility, nervousness, jitter, 
scaredness, and fear). The latter three were included as a measure of general discomfort, while 
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the former two, namely guilt and shame, were used as a measure of specific religious cognitive 
dissonance. The instructions were to tick the box that best described the degree of momentary 
emotion on a 9-point Likert scale where 0 was ‘not at all’ and 8 was ‘very much’.  
Design and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either the dissonance 
condition (n = 21) or the control condition (n = 21). The procedure for both conditions was 
identical except for the second questionnaire, which was either the dissonance or the control one. 
When they arrived to the lab, participants in both conditions were given the consent form in 
which they were informed that the study was part of a religious education project. This deception 
was used to increase participants’ commitment to the study by telling them beforehand that the 
religious activities that they would be advocating in the manipulation questionnaire were for a 
good cause.  
Next, depending on which group they had been randomly allocated to, participants were 
asked to fill out either the manipulation questionnaire or the control questionnaire. Both 
consisted of three equivalent parts, as described above. After this, the PANAS scale was handed 
out, and participants were asked to indicate to what extent they felt each of the emotions in the 
present moment. 
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Results 
Manipulation check. The average behavioural gap for the six religious activities in the 
dissonance condition was 1.43 points (SD = 0.81), showing that on average, participants were not 
content with their recent behaviour (remember that an average of ‘0’ would have indicated that 
participants were content with their recent behaviour). 
             The PANAS guilt and shame questions were combined into a guilt-shame variable, with 
a reasonably high Cronbach’s alpha of .77. Similarly, the distress, irritability, and upset questions 
were grouped together in a general discomfort variable, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .76. Figure 1 
illustrates these two compound variables in the two conditions. A mixed ANOVA with 
dissonance as between-subject variable and affect as within-subject variable indicated no main 
effect of dissonance, F(1, 40) = 0.56, p = .46, ηp2= .014, or affect F(1, 40) = 1.03, p = .32, ηp2= 
.025, but a Dissonance  Affect interaction, F(1, 40) = 10.52, p = .002, ηp2= .208. The 
experimental group (M = 3.62, SD = 3.88) reported a higher level of guilt-shame than the control 
group (M = 1.52, SD = 2.14), t(40) = 2.17, p = .036, r2 = .10. By contrast, no difference in 
general discomfort was found between the dissonance group (M = 1.62, SD = 2.46) and the 
control group (M = 2.57, SD = 2.68), t(40) = -1.16, p = .25, r2 = .03, nor did the two groups differ 
on any of the other five negative emotions of hostility, nervousness, jitter, scaredness, and fear.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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Discussion 
Experiment 1 indicated that the modified religious hypocrisy paradigm triggers the 
emotions of guilt and shame, but no evidence was found for the general discomfort (e.g., 
irritability, upset, and distress) that previous research on cognitive dissonance through induced 
compliance has shown (e.g., Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Elkin & Leippe, 1986). We suspected that 
the slightly higher general discomfort in the control group was due to some of the control 
activities, especially exercising, where participants might have felt uncomfortable for not having 
done enough. For this reason, the control activities were kept more neutral in Experiment 2.  
Experiment 2 
The aims of Experiment 2 were to replicate the findings of guilt and shame found in 
Experiment 1, and to test whether religious hypocrisy-induced cognitive dissonance could be 
resolved through religious self-affirmation. It was hypothesised that an opportunity to reduce 
cognitive dissonance via a religious self-affirmation opportunity would decrease the negative 
affect that results from the dissonance, as proposed by self-affirmation theory (Steele & Liu, 
1983).  
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Method 
Participants. Eighty-five participants (72 Christians and 13 Muslims; 59 females) from 
the student population of the University of Cambridge took part. The mean age was 24.2 years. 
They were selected from a pool of participants who had been recruited from the university 
student population, as well as from the local community of Cambridge.      
       
Materials. The questionnaire used in the dissonance condition was the same as the one 
used in Experiment 1. The first part of the control condition questionnaire was identical to the 
first part of the manipulation questionnaire used in Experiment 1, and it asked participants why 
they thought that the six religious activities were important to Christians/Muslims (depending on 
the participant’s own affiliation). Having the first part of the control questionnaire identical to 
the first part of the manipulation questionnaire was an improvement from Experiment 1 because 
this made the two conditions differ only on the hypocrisy induction, and not on writing about the 
importance of the six religious activities. The second part asked participants how often they had 
engaged in six everyday activities: Grocery shopping, using public transport, biking, socialising 
with new people, having a meal in a public place, and going to the cinema. These activities were 
chosen because they were considered more neutral than the activities in Experiment 1, and 
therefore less likely to cause emotional discomfort in participants who felt that they had under- 
or over-performed them. The third part asked participants how much time they thought that they 
should have spent on each of the six everyday activities.    
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A religious self-affirmation task was used in the self-affirmation conditions to reduce the 
cognitive dissonance by asking participants to write briefly (six lines on an A1 sheet were 
provided) about their most important religious values with the following instructions: ‘In order 
for us to understand your religious attitudes better, we would like you to write briefly what the 
most important religious values to you are at a personal level.’ We expected that this would 
reduce the cognitive dissonance because the opportunity to write about important religious 
values was likely to cancel out any guilt and shame induced by the hypocrisy by making the 
religious values, rather than religious behaviours, salient.  
For the emotions measure, only five of the negative cognitive dissonance-relevant 
emotions of guilt, shame, irritability, distress, and upset were included.  
Design and procedure. The design was a 2  2 factorial with dissonance and self-
affirmation as the two independent variables. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
four conditions: Dissonance (n= 22), dissonance with self-affirmation (n= 22), control (n= 21), 
and control with self-affirmation (n= 20). The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except 
for the inclusion of the self-affirmation questionnaire which was administered after the hypocrisy 
(or control) questionnaire, but before measuring the dependent variable of emotion. 
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Results  
Manipulation check. The average behavioural gap for the six religious activities in the 
dissonance conditions was 1.52 points (SD = 0.83), showing that on average, participants thought 
that they had underperformed the religious activities. This behavioural gap was similar to that 
found in Experiment 1 (i.e., 1.43). 
 Figure 2 shows the results. We carried out a mixed ANOVA with dissonance and self-
affirmation as between-subject variables and affect as within-subject variable. There were no 
main effects of self-affirmation, F(1, 81) = 0.98, p = .32, ηp2= .012 or affect, F(1, 81) = 3.31, p = 
.073, ηp2= .039, but a main effect of dissonance was found, F(1, 81) = 7.57, p = .007, ηp2= .085. 
However, this effect was qualified by an interaction between dissonance and self-affirmation, 
F(1, 81) = 5.06, p = .027, ηp2= .059. (The other interactions were non-significant, all Fs < 1.) 
This interaction was further examined by carrying out two separate ANOVAs for the two levels 
of the self-affirmation variable. In the absence of self-affirmation, there was a main effect of 
dissonance, F(1, 41) = 10.86, p = .002, ηp2= .209, but no main effect of affect, F(1, 41) = 2.58, p 
= .12, ηp2= .059, and no Dissonance  Affect interaction,  F < 1. The dissonance condition had a 
higher score than the control condition for guilt/shame (M = 2.64, SD = 2.73 vs. M = 0.52, SD = 
0.98; F(1,41) = 11.15, p = .002, ηp2= .214), but only marginally so for general discomfort (M = 
3.45, SD = 4.26 vs. M = 1.57, SD = 1.77; F(1, 41) = 3.51, p = .068, ηp2= .079). A different 
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pattern was observed in the presence of self-affirmation, where there was no main effect of 
dissonance (F < 1) or affect (F < 1), and no interaction (F = 1).  
 
 Insert Figure 2 about here  
Discussion 
The effect of hypocrisy-induced guilt and shame found in Experiment 1 was replicated in 
the current study: Participants who were in the dissonance conditions felt more guilt and shame 
than participants in the control conditions. Moreover, the religious self-affirmation task 
eliminated the feelings of guilt and shame. Experiment 2 has also shown that merely asking 
people how important religious activities are is not sufficient to induce cognitive dissonance, as 
seen in the control conditions. In order to induce cognitive dissonance, the second part of the 
manipulation questionnaire where participants were asked how often they had engaged in, and 
should have engaged in, the religious activities was necessary to evoke the feeling of hypocrisy 
and dissonance.  
Experiment 3 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate whether, in addition to guilt and shame, 
religious attitudes are also affected by dissonance. It was predicted that, similarly to previous 
research on religious cognitive dissonance that has used the belief disconfirmation paradigm 
(Batson, 1975), the hypocrisy paradigm would trigger a boost in religious attitudes as a response 
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to cognitive dissonance. In addition, Experiment 3 examined the effects of two different types of 
self-affirmation tasks: one domain-specific (religious) and another neutral to test whether one 
works more effectively than the other. Thus, the experiment consisted of four groups: 
dissonance, control, dissonance with religious self-affirmation, and dissonance with non-
religious self-affirmation. 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-nine participants (66 Christians and 13 Muslims; 51 females) from 
the student population of the University of Cambridge took part. The mean age was 26.6 years 
Participants were selected from the same pool of participants as in Experiments 1 and 2.  
Materials. The hypocrisy and control questionnaires, as well as the emotion questionnaire 
were identical to the ones used in Experiment 2. A 13-point religious attitudes scale (where ‘0’ 
was ‘not at all important’ and ‘12’ was ‘extremely important’) was used to measure participants’ 
attitudes toward the six religious behaviours that were used to induce the cognitive dissonance: 
praying, scripture reading, going to a place of worship, telling non-believers about one’s faith, 
helping the needy, and reading books about one’s faith. Participants were asked to indicate for 
each of the six behaviours how important they were to them in their faith.  
Instead of the open-ended self-affirmation task that was used in Experiment 2, two 
separate self-affirmation questionnaires, each consisting of six statements on a 7-point Likert 
scale (where ‘0’ was anchored as ‘Not at all important to me’ and ‘6’ was anchored as 
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‘Extremely important to me’) were used. The first of these was the non-religious self-affirmation 
questionnaire which asked participants how important they considered six virtues (i.e., ‘treating 
everybody equally’, ‘not keeping account of people’s wrongdoings’, ‘practising compassion’, 
‘loving one’s neighbour’, ‘being humble’, and ‘showing patience for fellow humans’). These 
virtues were selected because they are pro-social but not necessarily religious. Hence, the use of 
these pro-social items was seen as a good way to help participants to restore their self-esteem 
(and thereby reduce dissonance) in a non-religious domain. Participants were asked to rate how 
important each virtue was to them. The other self-affirmation questionnaire was religious (i.e., 
‘God can intervene in the world as much as He wants to’, ‘everything is known to God’, ‘God’s 
justice is unwavering’, ‘the nature of God is all-loving’, ‘God is present everywhere’, and 
‘everything was created by God’). Participants were asked to rate how important each statement 
was to them. These items were selected because they provide a direct religious route to 
dissonance resolution through a reminder of God’s positive attributes. These religious items were 
inspired from a previous study on religious dissonance where similar religious self-affirmation 
items were used (Burris et al., 1997).  
Design and procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except for the 
inclusion of the attitude measure which was inserted before the emotions measure. Similarly to 
Experiment 2, the self-affirmation questionnaires were handed out after the hypocrisy 
questionnaire, and before measuring the attitudes and emotions.  Participants were randomly 
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assigned to one of the four conditions: Dissonance (n= 20), control (n= 20), dissonance with 
religious self-affirmation (n= 20), and dissonance with non-religious self-affirmation (n= 19).   
Results    
We first discuss the attitude results, and then the affect results. In both cases, we first 
compare the results of the control group with those of the dissonance group (this provides a 
replication of Experiment 1, but with the additional attitude variable). We then compare the 
dissonance group with the dissonance with religious self-affirmation (RSA) and the dissonance 
with non-religious self-affirmation (NSA) groups, allowing us to test whether a religious self-
affirmation task is any less effective in reducing religious dissonance, compared to a non-
religious self-affirmation task.  
Manipulation check. The average behavioural gap for the six religious activities in the 
dissonance conditions was 1.33 points (SD = 0.83), showing that on average, participants thought 
that they had underperformed the religious activities. This behavioural gap was similar to those 
found in Experiments 1 (i.e., 1.43) and 2 (i.e., 1.52). 
Attitude change. A t-test showed that total religious attitudes (attitudes toward the six 
religious activities combined) were higher in the dissonance condition (M = 50.85, SD = 13.80) 
compared to the control condition (M = 40.15, SD = 15.95), t(38) = 2.27, p = .015, one-tailed, r2 
= .12, supporting the prediction that hypocrisy boosts religious attitudes.  
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A one-way ANOVA between dissonance, dissonance-RSA, and dissonance-NSA was 
significant, F(2, 56) = 3.27, p = .045, ηp2= .104. A post-hoc Dunnett test indicated that the 
dissonance group obtained reliably higher scores (M = 50.85, SD = 13.8) than the dissonance-
RSA group (M = 40.0, SD = 16.1, p = .023) and the dissonance-NSA group (M = 40.1, SD = 
14.5, p = .038). 
 Affect. Figure 3 shows the results of the comparison between the dissonance group and 
the control group. Although the Figure suggests an effect of dissonance and a Dissonance  
Affect interaction, a mixed ANOVA with dissonance as between-subject variable and affect as 
within-subject variable did not find any main effect of dissonance, F(1, 38) = 2.12, p = .15, ηp2= 
.053, or affect (F < 1), or any interaction, F(1, 38) = 1.09, p = .30, ηp2= .028. 
When applied to the three dissonance conditions, a mixed ANOVA found a main effect 
of affect, F(1, 56) = 7.52, p = .008, ηp2= .113, with the scores for guilt-shame (M = 1.44, SD = 
2.30) being lower than those for general discomfort (M = 2.73, SD = 3.70), but no main effect of 
dissonance, F < 1,  and no interaction, F(1, 56) = 2.30, p = .11, ηp2= .076.   
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Insert Figure 3 about here 
Discussion 
As hypothesised, dissonance resulted in a boosting of the religious attitudes related to the 
six behaviours that were used to induce the cognitive dissonance. The reason for this increase in 
religious attitudes might be that, instead of attempting to reconcile their recent religious 
behaviour with their current attitudes, individuals were motivated to improve their religious 
efforts as a result of the guilt and shame that they experienced. Moreover, the attitude boosting 
effect was cancelled out by both the religious and the non-religious self-affirmation 
questionnaires, indicating that the domain of the self-affirmation need not be different to the 
religious domain in which the dissonance is induced.   
The lack of guilt and shame as the result of dissonance in Experiment 3, as opposed to 
Experiments 1 and 2, may be due to the fact that attitudes were measured before the emotions, 
and hence could have eliminated any dissonance. Therefore, by the time the participants 
completed the emotions questionnaire, they had already resolved their dissonance, and so did not 
feel any guilt or shame.  
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General Discussion 
Guilt and Shame as a Consequence of Religious Dissonance 
The present work has shown that religious dissonance induced through hypocrisy is 
characterised by feelings of guilt and shame. This is in contrast to the feelings of general 
discomfort that have previously been found in previous experiments on cognitive dissonance 
(e.g., Elliot & Devine, 1994). This suggests that religious cognitive dissonance induced through 
hypocrisy may be different in nature. Alternatively, the reason for this could be that the 
hypocrisy paradigm forces participants to confront their inconsistencies in a way that is more 
direct than the widely used induced compliance paradigm of cognitive dissonance where 
participants are asked to engage in a task that clashes with their attitudes (Senemeaud & Somat, 
2009). Because no other study has directly measured the affective consequences of hypocrisy 
using this paradigm, it is difficult to rule out the explanation that guilt and shame are emotions 
that always accompany hypocritical feelings, even when individuals are made to feel hypocritical 
about non-religious behaviours. It may be the case that guilt and shame are feelings associated 
with religious hypocrisy, but not with other hypocrisies (e.g., the ones that relate to health 
behaviours, as investigated by early studies such as Aronson et al., 1991).  
The present research has also contributed with new experimental support to self-
discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987). The theory proposes that discrepancies between actual and 
ideal (i.e., what one strives towards as a person) selves cause ‘dejection-related emotions’ (e.g., 
sadness, disappointment, and dissatisfaction) and that discrepancies between actual and ought 
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(i.e., what one feels obligated to be like) selves cause ‘agitation-related emotions’ (e.g., fear, 
threat, and restlessness). The hypocrisy paradigm, especially as employed in the present research 
where a question on how often participants should have engaged in the given activities was 
included, offers a direct way of testing the predictions made by self-discrepancy theory. The fact 
that guilt and shame were found to result from hypocrisy in Experiments 1 and 2 supports self-
discrepancy theory because it highlights the emotional consequences of personal inconsistencies, 
although guilt and shame are not mentioned specifically by self-discrepancy theory. However, 
some correlational studies have shown that shame is an emotion that accompanies most forms of 
self-discrepancies (Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998). Based on our findings in 
Experiments 1 and 2, we argue that there can an overlap between actual-ideal and actual-ought 
discrepancies because when our participants failed to engage in the religious activities to the 
extent that they should have, they may have fallen short of both their ideal and their ought 
selves. So while the hypocrisy paradigm with the instructions that we used is suitable for 
studying self-discrepancies, in its current form it does not enable a distinction between actual-
ideal and actual-ought discrepancies. Using different instructions to directly target both the 
actual-ideal and actual-ought discrepancies, one might be able to differentiate between these, 
and thereby between any differences in the emotional consequences of both discrepancies.  
The Augmentation of Religious Attitudes as a Result of Religious Dissonance 
The finding that religious attitudes were augmented as a result of religious hypocrisy 
seems counter-intuitive in light of the tradition of cognitive dissonance research that has used the 
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induced compliance paradigm (e.g., Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994; 
Martinie & Fointiat, 2006; Rhodewalt & Comer, 1979; Senemeaud & Somat, 2009). Such 
previous research has consistently found that individuals reconcile their attitudes with their 
behaviour, rather than increasing the gap between attitudes and behaviour further by boosting 
their attitudes, which was the outcome of Experiment 3. However, this effect of attitude 
bolstering is compatible with a previous quasi-experimental study (Batson, 1975), which found 
that when Christians’ religious beliefs were challenged by external material, their religious 
attitudes were strengthened. Batson’s (1975) study, which used the belief-disconfirmation 
paradigm (where cognitive dissonance is induced by presenting belief-conflicting information to 
participants) also found this attitude effect as a result of cognitive dissonance. The reason for this 
effect in the present work might be that religious individuals felt that their religious attitudes 
were too important to be reduced in strength simply because of a performance-related 
inadequacy. Alternatively, it may be the case that the hypocrisy manipulation functions as a 
reminder of the need to improve one’s behaviour – a sign of which can be the attitude 
strengthening effect. Hence, the fact that individuals strengthened their religious attitudes after 
feeling hypocritical could indicate their motivation to improve their behaviour.  
In their paper, McConnell and Brown (2010) showed that the direction of the attitude 
change caused by hypocrisy was moderated by participants’ self-complexity, which is the 
number of differentiated self-aspects that individuals have. Individuals who had high self-
complexity bolstered their attitudes regarding the topic (i.e., good study habits) that they were 
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made to feel hypocritical about, whereas individuals low on self-complexity reduced the strength 
of their attitudes as an attempt to reconcile these with their behaviour. In contrast, Experiment 3 
of the present work showed that there was an overall effect of religious attitude bolstering. It 
may be the case that self-complexity moderates attitude change when a single behaviour is 
targeted in the hypocrisy paradigm, whereas targeting multiple behaviours simply augments 
attitudes. A potential mechanism for this could be that inducing hypocrisy regarding several 
behaviours activates more aspects of the self-concept, which in turn creates a similar effect to 
that seen in high self-complexity individuals in the other study. Alternatively, the bolstering of 
religious attitudes as a consequence of hypocrisy might be a phenomenon specific to religious 
attitudes. Examining religious hypocrisy using a single behaviour, and measuring religious 
individuals’ self-complexity would progress our understanding of whether the current findings 
are unique to religious attitudes or whether they are the result of the multiple behaviours used in 
these experiments.  
The Effectiveness of both Domain-specific and Domain-nonspecific Self-Affirmations 
Our work has also indicated that when it comes to religious dissonance, the domain of the 
self-affirmation may not make a difference to the resolution of the dissonance, as shown in 
Experiment 3. This is in contrast to previous work on dissonance induced through the induced 
compliance paradigm, where participants preferred self-affirmation in a different domain to the 
one in which the dissonance was induced (i.e., they wrote an essay against funding increases for 
facilities and services for disabled people, Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995). The reason for 
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this discrepancy between the previous study and ours may be related to the nature of the domains 
(religious versus non-religious) or to the nature of the dissonance paradigms (the induced 
compliance versus the hypocrisy). One way in which the religious domain differs from other 
domains is that religious individuals are able to rely on God for mercy and forgiveness, and 
thereby ridding themselves of their flaws. The religious self-affirmation that we used in 
Experiment 3 was related to God’s attributes, some of which were related to God’s love and 
power, so it may be the case that a reminder of these attributes reduces dissonance despite being 
in the religious domain. It may also be the case that the hypocrisy paradigm does not require a 
domain-neutral self-affirmation because the dissonance is induced blatantly, whereas it is 
relatively more indirect in the induced compliance paradigm (i.e., the participants are not 
confronted with their discrepancies). Hence, the hypocrisy-related dissonance may be reduced 
within the same domain because it directly resolves the obvious hypocrisy. However, in order to 
clarify whether the present findings of self-affirmation are the result of the domain or the 
paradigm, further research that isolates these two variables is required.  
Conclusions and Limitations 
Our work has furthered research on cognitive dissonance in four ways. First, we have 
shown that the emotions of guilt and shame can result from hypocrisy-induced cognitive 
dissonance. Second, we have demonstrated that the hypocrisy paradigm can be used to test self-
discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) by including a question on the behavioural gap, which is the 
gap between one’s actual and one’s ideal behaviour. Third, we have shown that an attitude 
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change in the opposite direction of an attitude-behaviour reconciliation can result from religious 
cognitive dissonance. Fourth, we have provided evidence that, at least in the religious domain, 
even a self-affirmation opportunity from the same domain as the dissonance-induction can 
relieve dissonance and its emotional and attitudinal consequences.   
One limitation of the present work is that it does not determine whether the findings of 
the three experiments are unique to religious cognitive dissonance, or whether they are the 
consequences of the hypocrisy-induced dissonance. In future research, it would be particularly 
interesting to investigate whether guilt and shame result from hypocrisies other than the 
religious. Another limitation of the present investigation is that we were unable to differentiate 
between the two main types of self-discrepancies (i.e., actual-ideal and actual-ought) proposed 
by Higgins (1987). Future research should use the hypocrisy paradigm to target these using more 
specific instructions during the dissonance-induction in order to shed more light on both self-
discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Guilt-shame and general discomfort as a function of dissonance (error bars represent 
+/– 1 standard error). 
Figure 2. Guilt-shame and general discomfort as a function of dissonance and self-affirmation 
(error bars represent +/– 1 standard error). 
Figure 3. Guilt-shame and general discomfort as a function of dissonance and self-affirmation 
(error bars represent +/– 1 standard error). 
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